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BEYOND CUSTODY: EXPANDING 
COLLATERAL REVIEW OF STATE 
CONVICTIONS 
Federal district • courts protect substantive constitutional 
rights against state encroachment in part by utilizing a writ of 
habeas corpus, 1 the traditional procedure for collateral review of 
state criminal convictions. 2 This safeguard for federally guaran-
teed rights, however, cannot be invoked by all parties alleging 
constitutional8 deprivations in the state criminal process. Only 
petitioners in custody can avail themselves of habeas corpus re-
lief; those not in custody must rely upon direct appeal for vindi-
cation of their constitutional rights. Direct af>peal, though, may 
be insufficient to check state intrusions upon federal rights, leav-
ing defendants not in custody without an adequate federal fo-
rum for their constitutional claims. 
In Hanson v. Circuit Court,• for example, inadequate direct 
review produced serious consequences for defendant Hanson. 
Hanson had been convicted on an lliinois weapons charge. His 
pro se direct appeal of the conviction lapsed after he could not 
obtain a trial transcript or appointed counsel, despite his asser-
tion of indigency. Hanson was subsequently imprisoned in Cali-
fornia on another charge; when he applied for parole, he con-
cluded that state law mandated the parole board to consider the 
1 See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2254 (1976). · 
• Habeas corpus review is a constitutional imperative: "The Privilege of the Writ of 
Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended unleBB when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the 
public Safety may require it." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 2. Until 1867, however, state 
prisoners could not invoke habeas corpus relief in federal courts. See Mayers, The 
Habeas Corpus Act of 1867: The Supreme Court as Legal Historian, 33 U. Cm. L. REv. 
31 (1965). 
• Some nonconstitutional federal claims also are cognizable in habeas corpus. See 
notes 55-58 and accompanying text infra. Moreover, habeas corpus will not lie to redreBS 
Fourth Amendment violations. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). See note 138 infra. 
This article concerns itself primarily with collateral attacks alleging constitutional er-
ror, excepting Fourth Amendment claims, in the state proceBB. Not only is there a leBSer 
scope of habeas corpus relief available for claims of nonconstitutional enor, but further, 
"it is the rare criminal appeal that does not involve a 'constitutional' claim." Friendly, ls 
Innocence Irrelevant? Collateral Attack on Criminal Judgments, 38 U. Cm. L. REv. 142, 
156 (1970). 
• 591 F.2d 404 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 907 (1979). 
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prior weapons conviction. 1 Hanson sought collateral review to 
avert this detrimental consequence of the prior allegedly uncon-
stitutional conviction, but could not satisfy the habeas custody 
requirement. 6 Instead, he pursued collateral review under the 
Civil Rights Act of 1871, 42 U.S.C. § 1983.7 The lower courts, 
however, refused to consider Hanson's claim under section 1983, 
and the Supreme Court, over Justice White's dissent, denied 
certiorari. 8 
Lower federal courts are split9 over the availability of collat-
eral review under section 1983 where habeas corpus does not 
lie. 10 A pressing question, then, concerns whether collateral re-
view should span beyond the bounds of the habeas corpus cus;. 
tody requirement. This article advocates extension of collateral 
• 591 F.2d at 408 n.9. 
• The writ of habeas corp118 requires that custody arise from the conviction under 
collateral attack. Thus Hanson's imprisonment did not constitute cll8tody for the pur-
poses of a habeas action seeking declaratory and injunctive relief against Illinois officials. 
The Circuit Court, however, suggested strongly that Hanson seek habeas relief against 
the California parole authorities, id. at 412, reasoning that habeas corpus can be invoked 
against present custodians to challenge a prior conviction prolonging the period of con-
finement. Id. at 408. 
7 The statute provides: 
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, CU8tom or 
usage, of any State or Tenitory, subjecta, or call8es to be subjected, any citizen 
of the United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the depri-
vation of any rights, privileges, or inimunities secured by the Constitution and 
laws, shall be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or 
other proper proceeding for redress. 
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1976). Although the Civil Rights Act has existed in its present statu-
tory form since 1867, its use has burgeoned in the past twenty years. See generally Cof-
fin, Justice and Workability: Un Essai, 5 SunoLK U.L. RBv. 567, 569-70 (1971); Devel-
opments in the Law - Section 1983 and Federalism, 90 HARV. L. REv. 1133, 1172 (1977) 
[hereinafter cited as Section 1983 Developments). 
Collateral review is also available to federal prisoners attacking the constitutionality of 
their confinement. 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1976). "Collateral review" as used in this article 
refers to federal court review of state criminal convictions, which raises fundamentally 
different issues from § 2255 collateral attacks upon prior criminal judgments originating 
in the federal system. For further illumination regarding § 2255 collateral review, see 
generally United States v. Hayman, 342 U.S. 205 (1952); Developments in the Law -
Federal Habeas Corpus, 83 HARv. L. REv. 1038, 1062-66 (1970) [hereinafter cited as 
Habeas Corpus Developments]. 
• Hanson v. Circuit Court, 444 U.S. 907 (1979). 
• Two courts have endorsed § 1983 as a vehicle for collateral attack on state criminal 
convictions, see Shipp v. Todd, 568 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); Pueschel v. 
Leuba, 383 F. Supp. 576 (D. Conn. 1974) (dictum), while three other courts have rejected 
collateral review under§ 1983. See Waste Management of Wis., Inc. v. Fokakis, 614 F.2d 
138 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 782 (1980); Hanson v. Circuit Court, 591 F.2d 404 
(7th Cir.), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 907 (1979); Cavett v. Ellis, 578 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1978) 
(dictum). 
•• See Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 440 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting) ("The Court has 
never expressly decided whether and in what circumstances § 1983 can be invoked to 
attack collaterally state criminal convictions."); 
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review to embrace all parties alleging deprivation of federally 
guaranteed rights in the state criminal process, regardless of 
whether the party fulfills the habeas corpus custody require-
ment. Part I assesses the sufficiency of Supreme Court certiorari 
jurisdiction to monitor adequately state adjudications of federal 
constitutional rights, coupled with an evaluation of the technical 
coinpetency and institutional posture of state courts. Part II ex-
amines the significance of the custody limitation on collateral re-
view, both as a substantive element of habeas corpus relief and 
as a mechanism for funnelling limited judicial resources. Part III 
presents two alternative means for expanding the scope of col-
lateral review of state convictions: legislation eliminating the 
statutory habeas corpus custody requirement, or use of section 
1983 as a vehicle for collateral review given the unavailability of 
habeas corpus. Part III also discusses the suitability of section 
1983 as an instrument for expanding collateral relief beyond the 
habeas custody requirement, concluding that such an expansion 
is essential to the effectuation of substantive federal constitu-
tional principles. 
I. THE NECESSITY FOR COLLATERAL REVIEW 
Petitioners in custody11 who exhaust state judicial remedies11 
have traditionally obtained collateral review of their state con-
victions through a writ of habeas corpus.18 Habeas corpus serves 
as an institutional safeguard to supervise state enf orcemeni of 
federal rights, ensuring that the federal courts are installed as 
final arbiters of constitutional principles.14 As such, habeas 
corpus represents a critical procedural complement to the ex-
pansion of substantive federal rights.111 Habeas corpus relief, 
however, is limited to claimants in custody. The habeas custody 
11 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a) (1976). See note 16 and accompanying text infra. 
•• 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1976). See note 98 and accompanying text infra. 
11 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2254 (1976). See generally Habeas Corpus Developments, supra 
note 7. 
" See, e.g., McCormack, Federalism and Section 1983: Limitations on Judicial En-
forcement of Constitutional Claims (pt. II), 60 VA. L. RBv. 250, 259 (1974); Reitz, Fed-
eral Habeas Corpus: Postconviction Remedy for State Prisoners, 108 U. PA. L. RBv. 461, 
464 (1960); Habeas Corpus Developments, supra note 7, at 1061-62; see notes 59-60 and 
accompanying text infra. 
10 Spritzer, Criminal Waiver, Procedural Default and the Burger Court, 126 U. PA. L. 
RBv. 473, 473 (1978); Wright & Sofaer, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: The 
Allocation of Fact-Finding Responsibility, 75 YALB L.J. 895, 896 (1966). See also Cover 
& Aleinikoff, Dialectical Federalism: Habeas Corpus and the Court, 86 Y ALB L.J. 1035, 
1041 (1977). 
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requirement, although liberally construed to include situations 
other than incarceration, 18 nonetheless has made habeas corpus 
"largely the exclusive prerogative of long-term felony convictions 
claiming trial error. "17 
A broad class of defendants thus are barred from collateral 
review of their convictions. State criminal defendants subject to 
fine without imprisonment, 18 state prisoners unconditionally re-
leased after discharging their prison sentences, 19 and corporate 
criminal defendants, 16 for example, stand outside the contours of 
the custody requirement · and cannot invoke· the writ of habeas. 
These defendants, while not incarcerated or subject to the depri-
vations traditionally associated with custody, still have ample 
reason to seek expungement of their conviction records. 11 Courts 
often acknowledge the "substantial stake in the judgment of 
conviction which survives the satisfaction of the sentence. "11 
Detrimental legal consequences flow from a criminal conviction: 
a person with a criminal record may be subject to impeachment 
in future criminal trials, be denied parole on the basis of previ-
•• "Custody" ranges beyond actual physical confinement, to embrace all restraints 
which prevent the habeas petitioner from doing "the things which in this country free 
men are entitled to do." Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 236,243 (1963). See, e.g., Hens-
ley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345 (1973) (release on recognizance satisfies the habeas 
custody requirement); Braden v. 30th Judicial Circuit Court, 410-U.S. 484 (1973) (peti-
tioner could invoke habeas corpus to attack a Kentucky detainer while imprisoned in 
Alabama); Carafas v. La Vallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968) (prisoner unconditionally released· 
prior to grant of habeas relief nonetheless "in custody'' where habeas petition filed 
before release); Peyton v. Rowe, 391 U.S. 54 (1968) (prisoner could seek habeas relief 
even though not yet serving sentence for conviction to be collaterally attacked); Benson 
v. California, 328 F.2d 159 (9th Cir. 1964) (parolee considered "in custody" for habeas 
corpus purposes). 
17 Amsterdam, Criminal Prosecutions Affecting Federally Guaranteed Civil Rights: 
Federal Removal and Habeas Corpus Jurisdiction to Abort State Court Trial, 113 U. 
PA. L. REv. 793, 803 (1965). 
11 See, e.g., Hanson v. Circuit Court, 591 F.2d 404 (7th Cir.) (petitioner sought habeas 
corpus review of weapons charge for which he had been fined $150), cert.' denied, 444 
U.S. 907 (1979). 
•• See, e.g., Cavett v. Ellis, 578 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1978) (state prisoner had fully dis-
charged the sentences resulting from five convictions he alleged were constitutionally 
invalid). 
•
0 See, e.g., Waste Management of Wis., Inc. v. Fokakis, 614 F.2d 138 (7th Cir.) (cor-
poration, convicted of violating state antitrust law and fined $4000, sought declaration of 
unconstitutionality of the conviction), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 782 (1980). 
•• Expungement of the record of convictfon is an equitable remedy invoked whenever 
necessary to preserve fundamental rights or to vindicate constitutional principles. 
Menard v. Saxbe, 498 F.2d 1017, 1023 (D.C. Cir. 1974); Sullivan v. Murphy, 478 F.2d 938, 
968 (D.C. Cir. 1973). Recoupment of fines paid in satisfaction of a criminal conviction 
runs afoul of the Eleventh Amendment prohibition of ·damage or equitable remedies 
drawn from state coffers. Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 663 (1974); Section 1983 
Developments, supra note 7, at 1346 n.71. 
.. Fiswick v. United States, 329 U.S. 211, 222 (1946). 
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ous convictions, or incur the sanctions of recidivism statutes.18 
Additionally, civil disabilities attach to a criminal record; for in-
stance, some states have statutorily disenfranchised felons, and 
have denied public office, positions of public trust, and jury ser-
vice to persons with felony convictions. 14 Aside from formal stat-
utory disabilities, the social stigma of a criminal conviction will 
have deleterious effects upon the convict seeking employment, 
or otherwise attempting to live as a responsible citizen. Simi-
larly, a corporation convicted of criminal wrongdoing may suffer 
a tarnished public reputation, diminishing its opportunities to 
attract individual and institutional inve~tors. 
Notwithstanding the interests of out-of-custody claimants in 
seeking expungement of the record of conviction, the limited 
scope of collateral review causes concern only if (1) Supreme 
Court certiorari :review cannot_ sufficiently vindicate federal con-
stitutional claims, and (2) federal collateral review, if granted to 
parties not in custody, would offer protections not afforded by 
state courts. The following sections examine these two 
propositions. 
A. The Insufficiency of Certiorari Jurisdiction to Supervise 
State Constitutional -Adjudications 
Judges and commentators have argued that direct review am-
ply oversees state court adjudications of federally guaranteed 
rights.111 Supreme Court certiorari jurisdiction, however, cannot 
provide adequate assurance that state criminal proceedings will 
adhere to federal constitutional norms.18 Given the overwhelm-
" See Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 55 (1968) ("the obvious fact of life that most 
criminal convictions do in fact entail adverse collateral legal consequences"); Harrison v. 
Indiana, 597 F.2d 115, 118 (7th Cir. 1979); 4 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL Jumcs 22.24 
(2d ed. 1980). 
14 Note, Civil Disabilities of Felons, 53 VA. L. RBv. 403, 404 (1967). See generally 
Project, The Collateral Consequences of a Criminal Conviction, 23 V AND. L. RBv. 929 
(1970). 
" Hanson v. Circuit Court, 591 F.2d 404, 411 (7th Cir.) (Supreme Court review of 
state decisions "is sufficient to preserve the role of the federal courts as the ultimate 
guardian of federally guaranteed rights"), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 907 (1979); Currie, Res 
Judicata: The Neglected Defense, 45 U. Cm. L. RBv. 317, 333 (1978) ("Supreme Court 
review, not collateral attack, is the avenue of relief from errors of state law."); cf. Monroe 
v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 237 (1961) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting) ("The jurisdiction which 
Article ill of the Constitution conferred on the national judiciary reflected the assump-
tion that the state court, not the federal courts, would remain the primary guardians" of 
fundamental rights.), overruled in part on other grounds, Monell v. New York City 
Dept. of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978). 
" Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 534 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("our certiorari 
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ing mass of certiorari petitions passing before the Court each 
term, particularized review of the constitutional claims alleged is 
more fiction than fact. 17 Moreover, the nature of certiorari juris-
diction is not wholly suited to vindication of constitutional 
rights. Relitigation .of factual matters, far more available in col-
lateral actionsH than on direct review,29 may often be critical to 
adjudicating a consti~utional claim. so The many claims found 
meritorious in federal habeas corpus proceedings following de-
nial of certiorari amply support the hypothesis that Supreme 
Court review inadequately vindicates federally guaranteed 
rights.81 
B. Justifications for Relitigation of State Decisions 
by Lower Federal Courts 
Relitigation of state decisions by lower federal courts cannot 
be justified absent some preference for federal court adjudica-
tion of constitutional questions. Any model of judicial review 
must recognize the inherent possibility of error in the process. 89 
jurisdiction is inadequate for containing state criminal proceedings within constitutional 
bounds"); Stolz, Federal Review of State Court Decisions of Federal Questions: The 
Need for Additional Appellate Capacity, 64 CAL. L. REV. 943, 959 (1976) (the Supreme 
Court cannot "maintain more than token supervision of the resolution of federal law 
questions by the state courts"). 
n See Hart, Foreword: The Time Chart of the Justices, The Supreme Court, 1958 
Term, 73 HARv. L. REv. 84, 96 (1959); McCormack, supra note 14, at 257; Habeas 
Corpus Developments, supra note 7, at 1061; Note, Protecting Fundamental Rights in 
State Courts: Fitting a State Peg to a Federal Hole, 12 HARV. C.R.-C.L.L. REv. 63, 87 
(1977) . 
.. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1976); see Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293, 313 (1963). 
" See generally 16 C. WRIGHT, A. MILLER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PRO-
CEDURE§ 4033 (1977). 
80 See Beck v. Ohio, 379 U.S. 89, 101 (1964) (Harlan, J., dissenting) ("Federal habeas 
corpus, which allows a federal court in appropriate circumstances to develop a fresh re-
cord ... provides a far more satisfactory vehicle [than Supreme Court review] for 
resolving such unclear issues, for the judge can evaluate for himself the on-the-spot con-
siderations which no appellate court can estimate with assurance on a cold record."); 
Mishkin, The Federal "Question" in the District Courts, 53 CoLUM. L. REv. 157, 171 
(1953) ("the trial of an issue of fact may be as important a factor in the vindication of a 
federal right as the determination of the legal content of that right"); Reitz, supra note 
14, at 465. 
81 See Reitz, supra note 14, at 481-503 (examination of thirty-five petitions for certio-
rari which demonstrate the acute importance of habeas corpus); Amsterdam, supra note 
17, at 793-99 (arguing that federal appellate review of state decisions cannot adequately 
protect civil rights). See also Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 530-33 (1976) (Brennan, J., 
dissenting) (discussing facially apparent Fourth Amendment violations not redressed by 
appellate review) . 
.. Bator, Finality in Criminal Law and Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners, 
76 HARV. L. REV. 441, 453 (1963). 
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Lest judicial review deteriorate into an endless search for "ulti-
mate truth," the process at some juncture must assign "final 
competence to determine legality."88 If the reviewing court offers 
no greater expertise in considering the matters litigated previ-
ously, judicial review becomes merely repetitious litigation. 
Significant differences exist, however, between federal and 
state court adjudications of federal constitutional claims. Lower 
federal courts are more likely than state courts to make astute, 
perceptive applications of federal law." This may stem in part 
from a disparity in competency between state trial courts and 
federal district courts. 86 Federal district court judges are drawn 
from a more highly qualified applicant pool, through a process 
often based more upon merit, than their state trial court coun-
terparts. 88 Once selected, moreover, federal district judges enjoy 
superior support staffs and lighter caseloads than state trial 
judges.87 
More importantly, the state judiciary differs vastly from the 
federal bench in institutional orientation.88 Justice Brennan ob-
" Id. at 451. See also H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAw 138-41 (1961). 
M ALI STUDY OF THE DIVISION OF JURISDICTION BETWEEN STATE AND FEDERAL COURTS 
166 (1969) ("it is difficult to avoid concluding that federal courts are more likely to apply 
federal law sympathetically and understandingly than are state courts"). See also 
Chevigny, Section 1983 Jurisdiction: A Reply, 83 HARV. L. REv. 1352, 1356-58 (1970); 
McCormack, supra note 14, at 262-64; Neuborne, The Myth of Parity, 90 HARv. L. REv. 
1105 (1977); Note, The Preclusive Effect of State Judgments on Subsequent 1983 Ac-
tions, 78 CoLUM. L. REv. 610, 611 (1978) [hereinafter cited as The Preclusive Effect of 
State Judgments]. 
.. In contrast, a substantially lesser disparity exists between state appellate court and 
federal district court judges. Neuborne, supra note 34, at 1116 n.45; see Brennan, State 
Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 HARV. L. REv. 489, 495 (1977); 
Howard, State Courts and Constitutional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. 
L. REv. 873, 874 (1976). To the extent that appellate courts oversee state trial court 
applications of federal law, as in collateral actions requiring exhaustion of state remedies, 
see notes 98-116 and accompanying text infra, the hypothesized disparity in competency 
between state trial and federal district courts will be mitigated. Nonetheless, state trial 
court competency is relevant to evaluating the necessity for federal collateral review to 
effectuate constitutional rights because factual determinations, often critical to the adju-
dication of constitutional claims, are more subject to relitigation on collateral attack 
than in direct review proceedings. See notes 28-30 and accompanying text supra; 
Neuborne, supra note 34, at 1116 n.45. State appellate courts cannot create the buffer of 
protection for constitutional rights provided by federal district courts on collateral 
review. 
18 Neuborne, supra note 34, at 1121-22. 
" Id. at 1122. 
18 Several federal judges have rejected the suggestion of a disparity in competency 
between state and federal judges. See, e.g., Aldisert, Judicial Expansion of Federal 
Jurisdiction: A Federal Judge's Thoughts on Section 1983, Comity and the Federal 
Caseload, 1973 LAw & Soc. ORD. 557, 559; Lay, Modern Administrative Proposals for 
Federal Habeas Corpus: The Rights of Prisoners Preserved, 21 DB PAUL L. REv. 701, 716 
(1972) (it would be presumptuous "to claim that federal judges are more competent, 
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serves: "My state court responsibility, while it included jurisdic-
tion over federal questions and federal-state conflicts, was inevi-
tably colored by the fact that I was, after all, a state judge. "88 
State courts cannot be expected to weigh the extra-territorial 
consequences of constitutional adjudication in the manner in-
cumbent upon federal courts, or to strive as mightily as federal 
courts for uniform application of constitutional principles. ' 0 The 
state judge - who, more than the federal judge, interacts with 
law enforcement agencies and problems of lawlessness at a local 
level - may give undue weight to the substantive goals of state 
criminal law at the expense of federally guaranteed rights.'1 Fur-
thermore, life tenure effectively insulates federal judges from the 
majoritarian pressures imposed on most state judges through the 
election process.41 Given the "countermajoritarian and undemo-
cratic"" nature of the Bill of Rights, such pressures may sway 
state judges from stringent enforcement of constitutional 
rights." 
Recent decisions, however, have refused to recognize a dispar-
ity between state and federal courts.'11 This opposition may stem 
largely from the judiciary's "understandable wish" for parity, 
rather than a deeply rooted perception that state and federal 
courts are equally qualified to adjudicate federal rights. ' 6 
conscientious, or learned than their state brethren in the area of federal rights"). Judge 
Friendly's experiences do not "suggest that federal determination of' [constitutional] 
questions is notably better" than state adjudications. Friendly, supra note 3, at 165 
n.125. Yet even assuming no distinction in competency between federal and state 
benches, the difference in institutional orientation creates a disparity transcending rela-
tive abilities. See Lay, supra, at 717. 
19 Brennan, Some Aspects of Federalism, 39 N.Y.U. L. RBv. 945, 948 (1964) . 
.., Chevigny, supra note 34, at 1357-58. 
" Bator, supra note 32, at 510; Habeas Corpus Developments, supra note 7, at 1060. 
See also THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 506 (A. Hamilton) (Lodge ed.) ("the most discerning 
cannot foresee how far the prevalency of a local spirit may be found to disqualify the 
local tribunals for the jurisdiction of national causes"). 
•• Neuborne, supra note 34, at 1116 n.45, 1127-28. See also Bator, supra note 32, at 
510. 
41 Oakes, The Proper Role of the Federal Courts in Enforcing the Bill of Rights, 54 
N.Y.U. L. RBv. 911, 916 (1979). . 
44 Neuborne, supra note 34, at 1127-28. 
•• See, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 101 S. Ct. 411, 420 (1980); Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 
494 n.35 (1976). 
'" Neuborne, supra note 34, at 1105. See also Amsterdam, supra note 17, at 802: 
[T]he probability is that the popular organs of state prosecution will never effec-
tively protect federal civil liberties; that they will remain instruments for harass-
ment, not vindication, of P81'119DB who dare to exercise freedoms to which the 
United States is Constitutionally committed, but which its majorities who speak 
in the state process are not constitutionally built to accept. 
In Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 494 n.35 (1976), the Supreme Court found itself 
"unwilling to assume that there now exists a general lack of appropriate sensitivity to 
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II. CUSTODY AS A PREREQUISITE TO COLLATERAL REVIEW 
Despite the indispensability of collateral relief for vindication 
of federal constitutional principles, habeas corpus review of state 
criminal proceedings remains limited to persons in custody.47 
Parties not in custody, however, cannot be presumed to present 
less meritorious or significant constitutional claims than persons 
in custody. In fact, "many deep and abiding constitutional 
problems" in the criminal process evolve from prosecutions for 
relatively minor offenses frequently beyond the scope of habeas· 
relief . .a Parties not meeting the habeas corpus custody require-
ment may present substantial constitutional questions; signifi-
cant state infringements upon federal constitutional rights may 
not be ch~cked if custody determines the availability of collat-
eral review.49 
A. Habeas Corpus Review: A Mechanism for Effectuating 
Federal Constitutional Rights 
Decisions rejecting extension of collateral review beyond the 
confines of habeas corpus have been founded traditionally upon 
the significance of custody as an element of collateral relief.'° 
constitutional rights" in the state courts. It is not inconsistent, however, to perceive no 
"lack·of appropriate sensitivity to constitutional rights" among state courts while recog-
nizing that constitutional rights may not be fully vindicated in those courts. The dispar-
ity between state and federal court enforcement of federal rights stems not from overt 
state antipathy but rather from differences in competency and institutional orientation 
that subtly color state court judgments. The murkiness of the constitutional waters 
makes possible a disparity between state and federal court vindication of constitutional 
rights without abdication of the judicial oath by the state bench. See Maroney & 
Braveman, "Averting the Flood:" Henry J. Friendly, The Comity Doctrine, and the Ju-
risdiction of the Federal Courts-Part II, 31 SYRACUSE L. REv. 469, 508-09 (1980); cf. 
Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 225-26 (1969) (the disparity between federal 
and state court enforcement of federal constitutional rights creates a greater necessity 
for collateral review of state prisoner claims than those of federal prisoners); McCor-
mack, supra note 14, at 263 (habeas corpus jurisdiction impliedly rejects the notion of 
parity between state and -federal courts). 
" See notes 16-21 and accompanying text supra. 
•• Sibron v. New York, 392 U.S. 40, 52-53 (1968). See also Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 
U.S. 25, 33 (1972) (vagrancy cases, subject only to brief sentences of imprisonment or 
small fines, "often bristle with thorny constitutional questions"). 
" See The Preclusive Effect of State Judgments, supra note 34, at 615 (there is a 
"significant category of constitutional rights that cannot be protected by habeas 
corpus"). 
00 See, e.g., Waste Management of Wis., Inc., v. Fokakis, 614 F.2d 138 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 101 S. Ct. 782 (1980); Hanson v. Circuit Court, 591 F.2d 404 (7th Cir.), cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 907 (1979); Cavett v. Ellis, 578 F.2d 567 (5th Cir. 1978) (dictum). 
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Frequently, these decisions perceive the custody requirement as 
a substantive element of habeas corpus review rather than 
merely a jurisdictional prerequisite.111 The Supreme Court, rea-
soning that the writ essentially "enable[s] those unlawfully in-
carcerated to obtain their freedom,"61 has characterized the core 
of habeas corpus as being a challenge to the constitutionality of 
the "physical confinement itself. "58 
Two components of habeas corpus procedure dispel the pre-
mise that the writ serves only to remedy unjust imprisonment. 
First, the Supreme Court has held that habeas corpus jurisdic-
tion attaches when the petitioner files for habeas relief while in 
custody, even should the petitioner be unconditionally released 
subsequent to filing the habeas petition but prior to obtaining 
relief. M A grant of habeas relief after unconditional release 
seems fundamentally opposed to the depiction of habeas corpus 
solely as a remedy for unjust imprisonment. Second, petitioners 
alleging nonconstitutional federal error in the state process en-
joy less access to federal habeas corpus than those who assert 
constitutional deprivations. Habeas corpus relief is available to 
vindicate nonconstitutional federal claims only where the alleged 
error of law signifies "a fundamental defect which inherently re-
sults in a complete miscarriage of justice. "1111 Federal habeas re-
11 See, e.g., Allen v. McCurry, 101 S.Ct. 411, 417 n.12 (1980) ("the unique purpose of 
habeas corpus - to release the applicant for'-the writ from unlawful confinement"); 
Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973) (habeas corpus is "a remedy for 
severe restraints on individual liberty"). See also Meador, The Impact of Federal 
Habeas Corpus on State Trial Procedures, 62 VA. L. REv. 286, 286 (1966) (federal 
habeas corpus provides another layer of review for state criminal cases because they re• 
sult in custody); Section 1983 Developments, supra note 7, at 1337 ("federal _habeas 
corpus rests on the paramount importance of freedom from unlawful restraint"). 
11 Johnson v. Avery, 393 U.S. 483, 485 (1969). 
18 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 476, 489 (1973). 
14 Carafas v. La Vallee, 391 U.S. 234 (1968). The habeas relief at issue in Cara/as was 
apparently limited to expungement of the record of conviction, as the Court discussed 
extensively the collateral consequences attaching to a criminal record despite the uncon-
ditional release of the habeas petitioner. Id. at 237-38. Expungement of the record of 
conviction is precisely the remedy sought on collateral review by parties not in custody, 
see note 21 supra; it seems incongruous to enable a petitioner filing a habeas petition one 
day before being unconditionally released to seek expungement of the record of convic-
tion while denying relief to a party not in custody. 
A result similar to Cara/as was reached in Thomas v. Cunningham, 335 F.2d 67 (4th 
Cir. 1964), where the habeas petitioner obtained collateral review of six sentences fully 
served by the time of the habeas proceedings. See also Jones v. Cunningham, 371 U.S. 
236 (1963) (habeas petition brought by a prisoner released on parole). 
116 Davis v. United States, 417 U.S. 333, 346 (1974) (conviction for draft evasion chal-
lenged on basis that the induction order was invalid under the Selective Service Act) 
(quoting Hill v. United States, 368 U.S. 424, 428 (1962) (collateral review proceedings 
alleging that the trial judge had violated the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure)). 
Both Davis, 417 U.S. at 341, and Hill, 368 U.S. at 426, involved federal nonconstitutional 
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lief for constitutional claims, on the other hand, does not fall 
within such strictures.116 This differentiation cannot be recon-
ciled with a characterization of the custody requirement as 
"designed to preserve the writ of habeas corpus as a remedy for 
severe restraints on individual liberty."117 "Severe restraints" 
could as easily be the result of encroachments upon federal law 
as the product of federal constitutional violations.118 
The most accurate depiction, therefore, portrays habeas 
corpus review as a means to vindicate federal constitutional 
principles rather than as a remedy for unjust imprisonment.119 
The elasticity of the custody requirement has transformed the 
writ from its common law origins - when habeas corpus could 
not issue unless it would effect petitioner's "release from cus-
tody"80 - to a device ensuring state court adherence to federally 
guaranteed rights. 
B. Costs Involved in Expanding Collateral Review 
The custody requirement, some argue, prevents collateral 
review from imposing undue strains on the judicial system.81 
claims tendered by federal prisoners under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. See note 7 supra. But the 
Court has made clear that § 2254, the federal habeas corpus statute, and § 2255 are of 
identical scope. Davis, 417 U.S. at 343. See Fasano v. Hall, 615 F.2d 555, 557-58 (1st Cir. 
1980) (habeas petitioner asserted that his conviction had been obtained through breach 
of the Interstate Agreement on Detainers Act); Losinno v. Henderson, 420 F. Supp. 380, 
384-85 (S.D.N.Y. 1976) (habeas corpus would lie if petitioner could demonstrate that the 
wiretap and search warrant leading to his conviction violated the Omnibus Crime Con-
trol Act) . 
.. Kaufman v. United States, 394 U.S. 217, 223 (1969); Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 174, 
182 (1947). All federal constitutional claims presented by state petitioners are cognizable 
in habeas corpus, Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443 (1953), with the exception of Fourth 
Amendment allegations. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 426 (1976); see note 138 infra. 
•• Hensley v. Municipal Court, 411 U.S. 345, 351 (1973) . 
.. See 59 MINN. L. R.Ev. 633, 644 (1975) ("Certainly there is no ineluctable relationship 
between the constitutional nature of the claim raised and the degree of prejudice suf-
fered. A petitioner may indeed be more prejudiced by a nonconstitutional error than by 
one of a constitutional nature."). 
"" See McCormack, supra note 14, at 290 ("The vindication of constitutional rights 
has been seen by most courts as the most important aspect of habeas corpus relitigation, 
restraint on liberty being regarded as something like a sine qua non of standing."); Reitz, 
Federal Habeas Corpus: Impact of an Abortive State Proceeding, 74 IIARv. L. R.Ev. 
1315, 1344 (1961) (writ of habeas corpus exists to provide "a forum for the vindication of 
constitutional rights whenever violated"); Habeas Corpus Developments, supra note 7, 
at 1060-61 (habeas corpus jurisdiction is "an institutional device for the supervision of 
state enforcement of federal· rights"). 
00 Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 427 n.38 (1963). 
• 
11 See Waste Management of Wis., Inc. v. Fokakis, 614 F.2d 138, 140-41 (7th Cir.) 
(custody requirement "represents the balance Congress struck between the interest of 
the individual in remaining free of unlawful intrusion on his physical freedom and the 
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Under this view, the custody requirement provides a convenient 
benchmark, limiting habeas relief to cases presenting putatively 
unjust imprisonment, beyond which the costs of collateral review 
will not be incurred. 82 In extending collateral review beyond the 
custody requirement, the crucial question concerns whether the 
costs of collateral review outweigh the benefits of enabling par-
ties not in custody to present their federal constitutional claims 
in "the more sympathetic and competent forum. "88 
1. The additional burden on federal courts- Increasing the 
federal court caseload represents one obvious concern with ex-
panding the availability of collateral review." Justice Jackson 
cautioned that "[i]t must prejudice the occasional meritorious 
application to be buried in a flood of worthless ones. "811 Habeas 
corpus has been decried as "a plaything of penitentiary inmates 
to accomplish temporary vacation visits to the federal courts";86 
section 1983 actions are deprecated for making "the federal 
court a nickel and dime court. "87 Eliminating the custody pre-
requisite to collateral attacks on state convictions, however, will 
not obviously increase substantially the caseload burden of fed-
eral courts.88 This article's proposed exhaustion requirement89 
state courts' interest in remaining free of federal interference with their final judg-
ments"), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 782 (1980). 
" There cannot be an absolutist pursuit of proper adjudication of constitutional mat-
ters at the expense of other systemic values. Justice Holmes counseled:. 
All rights tend to declare themselves absolute to their logical extreme. Yet all in 
fact are limited by the neighborhood of principles of policy which are other than 
those on which the particular right is founded, and which become strong enough 
to hold their own when a certain point is reached. 
Hudson County Water Co. v. McCarter, 209 U.S. 349, 355 (1908). There are limits to the 
procedural protections to be established to ensure adequate adjudication of constitu-
tional rights, Wright & Sofaer, supra note 15, at 915; "citizens may not have a constitu-
tional right to be wholly free of injury at the hands of the state .... " Section 1983 
Developments, supra note 7, at 1228; see Address by Chief Justice Burger, ABA Winter 
Convention (Feb. 8, 1981), excerpted in N.Y. Times, Feb. 9, 1981, at 11, col. 1 (midw. 
ed.) ("The idealistic search for perfect justice has led us on a course found nowhere else 
in the world . . . [T]he judicial process becomes a mockery of justice if it is forever open 
to appeals and retrials for enors in the anest, the search or the trial."). 
•• Neuborne, supra note 34, at 1118. 
" See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 259 (1973) (Powell, J., concur-
ring); Friendly, supra note 3, at 148-49 . 
.. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 537 (1953) (Jackson, J., concurring). 
81 Goodman, Use and Abuse of the Writ of Habeas Corpus, 7 F.R.D. 313, 314 (1947). 
See also Friendly, supra note 3, at 143-44. 
17 Aldisert, supra note 38, at 569. See also Note, Limiting the 1983 Action in the 
Wake of Monroe v. Pape, 82 HARV. L. REv. 1486, 1493 (1969) [hereinafter cited as Limit-
ing Section 1983) . 
.. See Chevigny, supra note 34, at 1354 (most§ 1983 claims pose little time problem 
for the federal courts); Habeas Corpus Developments, supra note 7, at 1041 (the burden 
of habeas petitions on the federal courts is easily overstated). 
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should deflect any potential onslaught of actions from parties 
not in custody seeking collateral relief. Additionally, persons not 
in custody pursuing the arduous process of collateral review pre-
sumably sacrifice more alternative endeavors than do prisoners 
who file habeas petitions "as a form of occupational therapy.'"'0 
Even assuming that expansion of collateral review imposes 
substantial new burdens on federal courts, that alone cannot 
compel maintenance of the custody prerequisite to collateral re-
view. Concerns for judicial efficiency pale in comparison to the 
necessity for vindication of federal constitutional rights.71 Mis-
use, abuse or overuse of a judicial process should not warrant its 
denial or suspension. No assurance exists that making collateral 
review less accessible will effectively screen out frivolous actions 
while still enabling relief for meritorious allegations of constitu-
tional infringements. 71 
2. Undermining the finality of state court decisions- Some 
argue that expanding the scope of collateral review to parties not 
in custody will compromise the finality of state adjudications. 78 
Yet, finality, while promoting authoritative and responsible deci-
sionmaking in the state process, should not be a more valued 
objective than vindication of constitutional rights. 74 Further-
.. See notes 105-07 and accompanying text infra. 
70 17 C. WRIGHT, A. Mu.LER & E. COOPER, FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PaoCBDUR.B § 4261, 
at 588 (1978). 
71 Judge Bazelon observes: "Efficiency is nice, but it's really beside the point. The true 
measure of the quality of a judicial system is how many hidden problems it brings into 
public view and how well it stimulates the responsible officials and agencies into doing 
something about these problems." Bazelon, New Gods for Old: "Efficient" Courts in a 
Democratic Society, 46 N.Y.U. L. REv. 653,655 (1971). See also Sunal v. Large, 332 U.S. 
174, 189 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ("considerations of economy of judicial time 
and procedure, important as they undoubtedly are, become comparatively insignificant" 
beside the great object of the writ of habeas corpus); H. F'RIBNDLY, FEDERAL JURISDIC-
TION: A GENERAL Vmw 90 (1976) ("It is hard to conceive a task more appropriate for 
federal courts than to protect civil rights guaranteed by the Constitution against inva-
sion by the states."); Reitz, supra note 59, at 1349 ("difficult to diacover e:mctly where 
and how and to what extent the system would be so severely periled as to permit viola-
tions of the Constitution to go unexamined and unredreeeed"). 
71 Smith, Federal Habeas Corpus: State Prisoners and the Concept of Custody, 4 U. 
Rice. L. REv. 1, 51-52 (1968). 
71 See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamante, 412 U.S. 218, 259 (1973) (Powell, J., concur-
ring); Friendly, supra note 3, at 149. 
" See Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 424 (1963) ("conventional notions of finality in crimi-
nal litigation cannot be permitted to defeat the manifest federal policy that federal con-
stitutional rights of personal liberty shall not be denied without the fullest opportunity 
for plenary federal judicial review"); McCormack, supra note 14, at 257; Pollack, Propos-
als to Curtail Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: Collateral Attack on the 
Great Writ, 66 YALE L.J. 50, 65 (1956) ("where a personal liberty is involved, a demo-
cratic society employs a different arithmetic and insists that it is lees important to reach 
an unshakeable decision than to do justice"). 
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more, state courts can achieve a substantial degree of finality in 
the criminal process by studious adherence to federal constitu-
tional norms. 76 To the extent that state courts correctly decide 
federal questions, expanded collateral review can vindicate the 
state process rather than undermine its finality.78 
3. Exacerbating federal-state tensions-:- Eliminating the cus-
tody prerequisite creates a further concern. Increasing the scope 
of district court involvement in cases passing muster in state ap-
pellate processes might magnify federal-state tensions.77 Height-
ened tensions between federal and state courts, though, need not 
be dysfunctional.78 "Conflict" engendered by collateral review 
can create a dialogue which articulates and defines individual 
rights. This dialogue may serve a critical function in the clarifi-
cation of constitutional rights. The Supreme Court often im-
poses an open-ended solution for constitutional questions and 
awaits subsequent resolution by the lower courts. The Court 
thus defines a starting point of "discussion" between state and 
lower federal courts, with the ensuing dialogue profoundly influ-
encing the development of constitutional law.79 
" "(l]n a real sense there are right and wrong answers" to constitutional questions, 
Habeas Corpus Developments, supra note 7, at 1057, at least following the unsettled 
interlude when lower federal courts search for resolution of the legal issue. See notes 78-
79 and accompanying text infra. 
" Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 529-30 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting); Brennan, 
supra note 39, at 958; Meador, supra note 51, at 291. This analysis defines "finality" not 
88 a desire to foreclose relitigation but aa the ability to prevent reversal of state deci-
sions. In this sense "finality" relates closely to the minimization of federal-state tensions. 
An alternative conception of "finality" would emphaaize the foreclosure of relitigation 
rather than whether the state judgment will ultimately be vindicated in federal court. 
This orientation focuses upon generating repose and conserving judicial resources. Re-
pose should. not, however, be 88 significant an objective in criminal aa opposed to civil 
adjudications. More important than repose is the need to convince the defendant of the 
justice of sanction. See note 80 infra. Moreover, if the desire for "finality" intends to 
channel limited judicial resources, this concern does not warrant restricting the scope of 
collateral review. See notes 64-72 and accompanying text supra. 
" See, e.g., Schneckloth v. Bustamonte, 412 U.S. 218, 259 (1973) (Powell, J., 
concurring). 
" Cover & Aleinikoff, supra note 15, at 1047. 
,. Id. at 1065. Cover and Aleinikoff argue that state courts are likely to adopt a prag-
matic stance in the dialogue, while lower federal courts will incline toward a more uto-
pian perspective. Id. at 1050-51. But cf. Section Developments, supra note 7, at 1182 
("national community adhering to national constitutional values baa effectively stripped 
the states of much of their function in the definition of civil rights"). 
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III. BEYOND CUSTODY: PROVIDING COLLATERAL REVIEW WHEN 
HABEAS CORPUS IS UNAVAILABLE 
Because vindication of federal constitutional rights provides 
the true rationale for collateral review of state convictions, cus-
tody should not be a prerequisite to relief. The costs of eliminat-
ing custody as an element of collateral review do not outweigh 
the interest in adjudicating constitutional principles in a federal 
forum. 80 Direct review of state criminal adjudications inade-
quately polices the application of federal law in state courts 
"which have arguably demonstrated their unfitness" for the 
task. 81 Absent expansion of collateral review beyond the habeas 
corpus custody requirement, parties not in custody who allege 
constitutional deprivations in the state process cannot be as-
sured of full enforcement of their federal rights. 
A. The Legislative Solution 
The habeas corpus custody requirement could be eliminated 
by legislative fiat. Although the Constitution mandates the exis-
tence of habeas corpus, 82 the common law defines its particulars 
which to some extent are subject to legislative definition.88 
There have been substantial legislative inroads made into the 
custody prerequisite for state collateral review of state criminal 
convictions. Oregon, for example, has adopted a post-conviction 
act eliminating the custody requirement for collateral attacks on 
80 Judge Friendly identifies two other costs of collateral review, not relevant here to 
evaluating whether collateral relief should be available beyond custody. First, collateral 
review interferes with the rehabilitative process, by delaying the prisoner's recognition of 
the justice of sanction. Friendly, supra note 3, at 146. See also Bator, supra note 32, at 
452 ("swiftly and certainly become subject to punishment"). It may be argued, however, 
that rehabilitation is best served when prisoners are convinced their claims have been 
heard and considered adequately by the legal system. Wulf, Limiting Prisoner Access to 
Habeas Corpus - Assault on the Great Writ, 40 BROOKLYN L. REv. 253, 254 (1973). 
Furthermore, the force of a rehabilitative ideals argument is minimal regarding parties 
not in custody who seek collateral attack on their conviction following the imposition of 
sanctions. Friendly's second concern is with the delay caused by collateral review in final 
resolution of factual disputes, making the state prosecutorial task more difficult. 
Friendly, supra note 3, at 147. To the extent this argument has force it redounds against 
collateral review per se, not against extending collateral review to parties unable to sat-
isfy the habeas custody requirement. 
•• Wright & Sofaer, supra note 15, at 902. 
•• See note 2 supra. 
81 Bator, supra note 32, at 444 n.6; Note, Federal Habeas Corpus for State Prisoners: 
The Isolation Principle, 39 N.Y.U. L. REv. 78, 78 n.6 (1964). 
480 Journal of Law Reform [VOL. 14:3 
state convictions,114 mirroring the approach of the Uniform Post-
Conviction Procedure. Act811 and the suggested ABA standards 
on collateral review.88 There has been, however, no congressional 
inclination to eliminate the federal habeas corpus custody 
requirement. 
B. Section 1983 as a Vehicle for Collateral Review 
Given that legislative elimination of the habeas custody re-
quirement appears unlikely, extension of collateral relief to par-
ties not in custody must occur through judicial initiative. Judi-
cial · action can expand the scope of collateral review in the 
absence of legislation. 87 Several courts88 indeed have taken such 
action, enabling collateral attacks on state convictions under 
section 1983 of the Civil Rights Act where the plaintiff, seeking 
expungement of the record of conviction, cannot satisfy the 
habeas corpus custody requirement. Congress enacted section 
1983 as an element of a ·broad design to install the federal gov-
ernment as ultimate guardian of basic federal rights against 
state encroachment. 89 As such, section 1983 serves as an appro-
04 OR. REV. STAT. § 138.510 (1979); see Morasch v. State, 261 Or. 299, 493 P.2d 1364 
(1972) (petitioner seeking collateral review of a 1932 misdemeanor conviction); Colline & 
Neil, The Oregon Postconviction-Hearing Act, 39 OR. L. REv. 337 (1960) . 
.. UNIFORM PosT-CONVICl'ION PROCEDURE ACT § 1. 
80 4 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE std. 22-2.3 (2d ed. 1980). Approaches re-
garding state collateral review do not generalize fully to the question of federal collateral 
review of state convictions. State post-conviction relief is motivated by concerns differ-
ent from those of federal collateral review, which presumes inadequate adherence to fed-
eral rights in the state criminal process. Nonetheless, commentary accompanying the 
ABA guidelines argues that elimination of the custody requirement is necessary because 
parties not in custody still incur the adverse consequences of a criminal conviction. Id. at 
22.24; see notes 21-24 and accompanying text supra. 
•• It could be argued that the congressional silence bars abandonment of the custody 
prerequisite. See, e.g., Hanson v. Circuit Court, 591 F.2d 404, 412 (7th Cir.) ("abandon-
ment of the custody requirement is a matter for legislative, not judicial action"), cert. 
denied, 444 U.S. 907 (1979). Justice Cardozo noted, though, that "[l]egislatures have 
sometimes disregarded their own responsibility, and passed it on to the courts." B. CAR-
DOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 93 (1921). Moreover, judicial action may be 
most appropriate where necessary, as here, to vindicate constitutional principles. H the 
Constitution is "antidemocratic," Choper, On the Warren Court and Judicial Review, 17 
CATH. U.L. REv. 20, 38 (1967), the legislature might be expected not to act so to ensure 
full vindication of constitutional principles, warranting forceful judicial action. See 
Oakes, supra note 43, at 946 ("I suspect that much of the opposition to federal courts 
generally . . . is really based upon an underlying opposition to recognition of the rights 
in the first instance."). 
88 See Shipp v. Todd, 568 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1978) (per curiam); Pueschel v. Leuba, 
383 F. Supp. 576 (D. Conn. 1974) (dictum). 
80 See Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 180 
(1961), overruled in part on other grounds, Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social 
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priate vehicle for expanding the scope of collateral relief to in-
clude parties not in custody. Implicit in the statute are the pre-
sumed inadequacy of the state forum for enforcing federal 
constitutional rights,80 and the perceived necessity for adjudica-
tion of federal rights in a forum insulated from state influence. 81 
The writ of habeas corpus serves similar systemic functions.91 
A clear analogy exists between habeas corpus and section 1983: 
both devices serve to prevent erosion of federal rights in state 
courts.83 Positing section 1983 as a means to expand the scope of 
collateral review, therefore, does not conflict with the purposes 
underlying either the Civil Rights Act or the "Great Writ.''IM 
The analogy between habeas corpus and section 1983, though, 
is imprecise at certain points. The broad contours of section 
198386 contrast with the specific provisions of the habeas corpus 
statute." Acceptance of section 1983 as a vehicle for collateral 
review mandates special consideration of the exhaustion of state 
judicial remedies and the preclusive effect of state judgments -
two areas where the Civil Rights Act diverges markedly from 
habeas corpus procedure. 87 
Services, 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978); Section 1983 Developments, supra note 7, at 1150; 
Note, State Prisoners' Suits Brought on Issues Dispositive of Confinement: The After-
math of Preiser v. Rodriguez and Wolff v. McDonnell, 77 CoLUM. L. REV. 742, 766 (1977) 
[hereinafter cited as State Prisoners' Suits]. 
80 Theis, Res Judicata in Civil Rights Act Cases: An Introduction to the Problem, 70 
Nw. U.L. REv. 859, 868 (1976); Weinberg, The New Judicial Federalism, 29 STAN. L. 
REv. 1191, 1214_ (1977); see notes 34-44 and accompanying text supra. 
H Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972); Chevigny, supra note 34, at 1358; 
Wechsler, Federal Courts, State Criminal Law and the First Amendment, 49 N.Y.U. L. 
REv. 740, 852-53 (1974); Note, The Collateral Estoppel Effect of State Criminal Convic-
tions in Section 1983 Actions, 1975 U. ILL. L.F. 95, 99 [hereinafter cited as Section 1983 
Actions]. 
" See notes 14-15 and accompanying text supra. 
"" This analogy was acknowledged by the Supreme Court in Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 
428 (1963) (dictum) (the habeas corpus statute, "like the Civil Rights Act, was intended 
to furnish an independent, collateral remedy for certain privations of liberty"). See also 
Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475, 504 (1973) (Brennan, J., dissenting) ("every applica-
, tion by a state prisoner for federal habeas corpus relief . . . could, as a matter of logic 
and semantics," be viewed as an action under the Civil Rights Act); McCormack, supra 
note 14, at 259 ("analogy between habeas corpus and section 1983 cases rests on their 
both being aimed primarily at vindication of principle"); Torke, Res Judicata in Federal 
Civil Rights Actions Following State Litigation, 9 IND. L. REv. 543, 566 (1976). 
" Ex parte Bollman, 8 U.S. (4 Cranch) 75, 95 (1807) (Marshall, C.J.). 
" See, e.g., Limiting Section 1983, supra note 67, at 1488 ("The bare words of the 
statute are so broad as to be of little use in articulating purposes beyond making appar-
ent the aim of protecting federal rights against state action."). 
" See 28 U.S.C. §§ 2241-2254 (1976). 
07 A further distinction between § 1983 and habeas corpus lies in the applicability of 
the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. Collateral attacks on state convictions are civil 
proceedings rather than elements of the original criminal prosecution. Browder v. Direc-
tor, Dept. of Corrections, 434 U.S. 257, 269 (1978); Fisher v. Baker, 203 U.S. 174, 181 
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1. Exhaustion of state remedies- The disparity between sec-
tion 1983 and federal habeas corpus regarding the exhaustion of 
state judicial remedies presents an obstacle to collateral attacks 
on state criminal convictions under section 1983. Federal habeas 
corpus relief generally cannot be employed by the petitioner who 
fails to exhaust state remedies.98 In contrast, the Civil Rights 
Act is not subject to an exhaustion requirement," leading the 
Supreme Court to remark on the "continuing illogic of treating 
federal habeas corpus and § 1983 as fungible remedies for con-
stitutional violations. moo Indeed, the Court has expressly re-
jected section 1983 as a means for state prisoners having availa-
ble habeas relief to seek release from confinement, concluding 
that such section 1983 actions would effectively bypass and cir-
cumvent the habeas exhaustion policy.101 
(1906). Presumably the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure would have full force in a 
§ 1983 action seeking collateral review of a state judgment. See Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 
U.S. 475, 496 (1973); State Prisoners' Suits, supra note 89, at 765 n.159. In contrast, 
application of the Civil Rules to habeas corpus petitions rests within the discretion of the 
court, to the extent that the Rules do not conflict with those governing habeas actions. 
28 U.S.C. § 2254 R. 11 (1976). See generally 17 C. WRIGHT, A. Mu.I.BR & E. CooPBR, 
FEDBRAL PRACTICE & PRocEDURE § 4268 (1978). This distinction may be, however, more 
form than substance; many aspects of the Civil Rules are applicable to habeas corpus 
proceedings. See Browder v. Director, Dept. of Corrections, 434 U.S. at 271; Harris v. 
Nelson, 394 U.S. 286, 294 n.5 (1969). Furthermore, although habeas corpus pMC'A'iedings 
provide for more limited discovery, 28 U.S.C. § 2254 R. 6 (1976), than do the Civil Rules, 
FED. R. Crv. P. 26-37, this should not diminish the suitability of§ 1983 as a vehicle for 
collateral review. The discretion vested in the court under the Civil Rules would prevent 
abuse of discovery in § 1983 collateral proceedings . 
.. The habeas corpus exhaustion requirement had its origins in E" parte Royall, 117 
U.S. 241 (1886), as a judge-made policy of restraint, not becoming part of the statutory 
scheme until 1948. 28 U.S.C. § 2254(b) (1976). The sole exception to the exhaustion re-
quirement is where there is "either an absence of available state corrective process or the 
existence of circumstances rendering such process ineffective to protect the rights of the 
prisoner." Id.; see Habeas Corpus Developments, supra note 7, at 1097. 
A different issue arises where the habeas petitioner presents both unexhausted and 
exhausted claims for relief in one action. A prisoner may have fully appealed one claim 
while failing to raise others on appeal. See Comment, Habeas Petitions with E%hausted 
and Unexhausted Claims Dismissed for Failure to E%haust State Remedies - Gonzales 
v. Stone, 52 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1428 (1977); Note, Habeas Petitions with E%hausted and 
Une%hausted Claims: Speedy Release, Comity, and Judicial Efficiency, 57 B.U. L. REv. 
864 (1977). Here it will be assumed that any claim for relief is either wholly exhausted or 
entirely unexhausted. 
" McNeese v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 668, 671 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 
167, 183 (1961), overruled in part on other grounds, Monell v. New York City Dept. of 
Social Services, 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978). 
100 Allen v. McCurry, 101 S. Ct. 411,420 n.24 (1980). But see notes 152-59 and accom-
panying text infra. 
101 Preiser v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 475 (1973). The Court found habeas corpus to be 
solely the "appropriate remedy for state prisoners attacking the validity of the fact or 
length of their confinement .... " Id. at 490. Because the § 1983 plaintiff' was in cus-
tody, however, this decision did not reach the issue at hand. 
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The Court's concern with preserving the integrity of the 
habeas corpus exhaustion requirement" reflects more than mere 
formalism. The habeas exhaustion requirement embodies fed-
eral-state comity principles, dictating the appropriate exercise 
by the federal judiciary of conferred power.101 Requiring exhaus-
tion of state remedies prior to habeas relief promotes the in-
volvement of state courts in the application of federal law108 and 
avoids unnecessary friction between federal and state courts. 104 
Furthermore, the exhaustion rule enables the state appellate 
process to oversee trial court applications of federal law and to 
press for uniform results from those courts. 101 
The policy considerations underlying the habeas corpus ex-
haustion requirement apply with equal force where the state de-
fendant not in custody seeks collateral relief.106 Consequently, 
this article proposes that federal courts abstain from entertain-
ing collateral attacks under section 1983 where habeas corpus is 
unavailable until the plaintiff has first brought an appeal 
through the state system.107 An exhaustion requirement for sec-
tion 1983 actions seeking collateral relief would preserve the bal-
109 Picard v. Connor, 404 U.S. 270, 275 (1971); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 419-20 
(1963). See also State Prisoners' Suits, supra note 89, at 773. 
••• See Amsterdam, supra note 17, at 830 ("leaving federal defensive issues to the 
state criminal courts in the first instance gives those courts a promising opportunity for 
partnership in the administration of federal law"); Habeas Corpus Developments, supra 
note 7, at 1093-94. 
1°' See Darr v. Burford, 339 U.S. 200,204 (1950) ("[l]t would be unseemly in our dual 
system of government for a federal district court to upset a state court conviction with-
out an opportunity to the state courts to correct a constitutional violation .... "), over-
ruled in part on other grounds, Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 435 (1963). 
•
00 Habeas Corpus Developments, supra note 7, at 1094. See also State Prisoners' 
Suits, supra note 89, at 762-63, 763 n.150 ("Since the state, under federal exhaustion 
doctrine, has no final power not to release, the state interests protected by exhaustion 
thus seem in large part to be systemic, not substantive."). Contra, Comment, Exhaustion 
of State Remedies Under the Civil Rights Act, 68 CoLUM. L. REv. -1201, 1205-06 (1968) 
("[T]here is no sound policy reason for requiring the exhaustion of state judicial reme-
dies. . . . [T]he question is simply whether one court or another is going to decide the 
case."). 
108 Cf. State Prisoners' Suits, supra note 89, at 765 n.156 ("[W]hen a state prisoner 
seeks relief other than release in federal court on an issue dispositive of state confine-
ment the interests protected by comity are as much jeopardized as when he seeks 
release."). 
107 The federal habeas corpus rule requires only that the habeas petitioner have pur-
sued one avenue of state relief; the petitioner who has brought a direct appeal through 
the state system need not seek state collateral remedies prior to obtaining a writ of 
habeas corpus in federal court. Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 448 n.3 (1953). Further-
more, the habeas petitioner is not obliged to pursue direct review in the United States 
Supreme Court before obtaining habeas corpus relief. Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391, 435-36 
(1963). The proposed exhaustion requirement for § 1983 collateral attacks upon state 
convictions should conform to the contours of the habeas corpus exhaustion 
requirement. 
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ance struck by the habeas exhaustion requirement between state 
and federal interests. Such a requirement would concurrently 
prevent the section 1983 plaintiff, unable to satisfy the habeas 
corpus custody requirement, from enjoying a more expedient 
and favorable remedy in federal courts than the habeas 
petitioner. 108 
An objection to stipulating an exhaustion requirement109 
might arise because the general no-exhaustion rule for section 
1983 suits plays a critical role in the statutory scheme. 110 Per-
haps the imposition of an exhaustion requirement disregards a 
contrary congressional intent. 111 But the habeas corpus exhaus-
tion requirement, initially judicially self-imposed, became a stat-
utory requirement only within the past thirty-five years.111 The 
habeas exhaustion doctrine thus resulted from a judicial elec-
tion, grounded in notions of· comity, to decline an unmistakable 
congressional grant of jurisdiction.us Similarly, comity concerns 
dictate the exercise of judicial discretion in abstaining from con-
sideration of section 1983 collateral attacks on state convictions 
pending exhaustion of state judicial remedies. m Stipulation of 
108 See State Prisoners' Suits, supra note 89, at 765 (urging that there be an "exhaus-
tion requirement parallel to federal habeas exhaustion, which would apply when a state 
prisoner brings a civil rights suit for remedies other than release on an issue dispositive · 
of his confinement"); Note, The Collateral-Estoppel Effect to be Given State-Court 
Judgments in Federal Section 1983 Damage Suits, 128 U. PA. L. RBv. 1471, 1500 (1980) 
[hereinafter cited as Collateral-Estoppel Effect] (arguing for an exhaustion requirement 
in § 1983 damage actions). 
109 See, e.g., Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, 363 U.S. 207, 228 (1960) (Douglas, J., dissenting) 
(Many litigants "can hardly afford one lawsuit, let alone two. Shuttling the parties be-
tween state and federal tribunals is a sure way of defeating the ends of justice."); Am-
sterdam, supra note 17, at 834 ("the state criminal defendant is exhausted before his 
state court remedies are"). 
11
• See McNeese v. Board of Educ., 373 U.S. 668 (1963); Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 
(1961), overruled in part on other grounds, Monell v. New York City Dept. of Social 
Services, 436 U.S. 658, 663 (1978). 
111 See, e.g., Exhaustion of State Remedies Under the Civil Rights Act, supra note 
105, at 1206. A proposed amendment to § 1983 which died in committee might have 
barred stipulation of an exhaustion requirement. The Civil Rights Improvement Act of 
1979, S. 1983, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 CONG. REc. Sl5,994 (daily ed. Nov. 6, 1979), 
provided that no court would stay or dismiss any § 1983 action on the ground that the 
party seeking relief had failed to exhaust state judicial remedies. Id. § 2(e)(2). 
111 See note 98 supra. 
11
• Amsterdam, supra note 17, at 900-01. 
· m See, e.g., Martin v. Creasy, 360 U.S. 219, 224 (1959) ("Reflected among the con-
cerns which have traditionally counseled a federal court to stay its hand are the desir-
ability of avoiding unseemly conflict between two sovereignties [and) the unnecessary 
impairment of state functions .... "); Miller v. Miller, 423 F.2d 145, 148 (10th Cir. 
1970) ("abstention is proper when the exercise of federal jurisdiction might unnecessarily 
interfere with federal-state relations"); Monongahela Connecting R.R. Co. v. Penn-
sylvania Pub. Util. Comm'n, 373 F.2d 142, 146 (3d Cir. 1967) ("discretionary abstention" 
by federal court pending exhaustion of state appellate remedies). 
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an exhaustion requirement is appropriate where, as here, the 
section 1983 action resembles closely the writ of habeas corpus 
both in terms of remedies sought1111 and questions presented. 118 
2. The preclusive effect of state judgments- Stipulation of 
an exhaustion requirement for section 1983 collateral attacks 
must be accompanied by consideration of the res judicata effect 
to be afforded the prior state judgment in the section 1983 ac-
tion.117 Res judicata principles are not applicable to habeas 
11
• See note 54 supra. 
11
• Cf. Rimmer v. Fayetteville Police Dept., 567 F.2d 273, 275 (4th Cir. 1977) (dictum) 
(a § 1983 damage action bearing upon the validity of a state court conviction "so closely 
resembles an action for a federal writ of habeas corpus that a requirement of exhaustion 
of available state remedies may seem reasonable"); Wallace v. Hewitt, 428 F. Supp. 39, 
44 (M.D. Pa. 1976) (abstention in § 1983 action until plaintiff has exhausted state equi-
table judicial processes). A series of cases in the Fifth Circuit has required state prison-
ers to exhaust state remedies before bringing a § 1983 damage action in federal court on 
an issue going to the constitutionality of confinement, to prevent a "thinly disguised 
circumvention of state remedies." Fulford v. Klein, 529 F.2d 377, 381 (5th Cir. 1976), 
aff'd en bane, 550 F.2d 342 (5th Cir. 1977). See Meadows v. Gabrel, 563 F.2d 1231, 1232 
(5th Cir. 1977); Meadows v. Evans, 529 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir. 1976), aff'd en bane, 550 
F.2d 345 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 969 (1977). 
117 
"Res judicata" encompasses the distinct equitable principles of claim and issue 
preclusion. Claim preclusion, or merger and bar, prevents relitigation between parties on 
all matters subsumed within the same cause of action, regardless of whether those mat-
ters were actually litigated. Issue preclusion, or collateral estoppel, gives binding effect in 
a subsequent action to issues actually litigated and necessarily decided in a previous case 
involving the party to be estopped, where that party had opportunity and incentive to 
litigate the issue. See generally Cromwell v. County of Sac, 94 U.S. 351, 353 (1876); lB 
MOORE'S, FEDERAL PRACTICE 1111 0.405-.448 (2d ed. 1980); REBTATEMENT (SECOND) OP 
JUDGMENTS §§ 68-68.1 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977); REsTATEMENT (SECOND) OP JUDGMENTS 
§§ 47, 48-48.1, 61.2 (Tent. Draft No. 1, 1973). 
A different approach to the preclusion question, relying on Rooker v. Fidelity Trust 
Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923), would disallow federal district courts, as courts of original juris-
diction, to sit in appellate review of state decisions. See, e.g., Tang v. Appellate Div., 487 
F.2d 138, 141 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 906 (1974); Brown v. Chastain, 416 
F.2d 1012, 1013 (5th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 397 U.S. 951 (1970). The crux of the Rooker 
doctrine is that exclusive jurisdiction is vested in the Supreme Court to review state 
court adjudications, which implies that district courts should not be enabled to under-
mine the congressional allocation of appellate judicial power. Chang, Rediscovering the 
Rooker Doctrine: Section 1983, Res Judicata and the Federal Courts, 31 HASTINGS L.J. 
1337, 1342-50 (1980); Currie, supra note 25, at 322. 
Despite strident appeals from Chang and Currie, most commentators have summarily 
rejected the Rooker doctrine, arguing from the authority of Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678 
(1946), that federal district courts have jurisdiction whenever a federal question is 
presented on the face of the complaint even if the claim is precluded by res judicata 
principles. See, e.g., 88 HARv. L. REv. 453, 455 n.16 (1974); The Preclusive Effect of 
State Judgments, supra note 34, at 618 n.40; Section 1983 Developments, supra note 7, 
at 1334 n.14. Moreover, the Rooker doctrine cannot be fully apposite to the question at 
issue here. Federal habeas corpus review is one instance where federal district courts 
have regularly engaged in review of state decisions. Currie, supra note 25, at 323 n.50. 
Collateral attacks on state convictions cannot be subject to the rigid strictures on reliti-
gation urged by Currie, supra note 25, at 323-24, and Chang, supra, at 1353-56. 
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corpus proceedings.118 The effectiveness of section 1983 as a ve-
hicle for expanding habeas review, therefore, turns in large part 
upon the extent to which issue preclusion will bar relitigation in 
a section 1983 collateral attack of constitutional defenses adjudi-
cated in the state process. 119 
In general, federal courts apply res judicata principles to pre-
clude relitigation of issues or claims previously decided by state 
courts.12° Federal deference to state court proceedings stems 
from two sources. First, common law preclusion principles dic-
tate the application of res judicata to foster conclusive resolution 
of disputes121 and to "promote the comity between state and 
federal courts that has been recognized as a bulwark of the fed-
eral system. " 1211 Second, the full faith and credit statute, 28 
11
• Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 80 (1977); Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,423 (1963); 
Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443, 458 (1953). This "traditional exception" to res judicata 
derives from the "unique purpose of habeas corpus - to release the applicant for the 
writ from unlawful confinement." Allen v. McCurry, 101 S.Ct. 411, 417 n.12 (1980). But 
see notes 59-60 and accompanying text supra. 
11
• See Ellis v. Dyson, 421 U.S. 426, 440 (1975) (Powell, J., dissenting) (the extent to 
which res judicata barred relitigation of constitutional issues decided in state proceed-
ings would determine whether § 1983 could be invoked for collateral review of state 
criminal convictions). See generally Vestal, State Court Judgment as Preclusive in Sec-
tion 1983 Litigation in Federal Court, 27 OKLA. L. REv. 185 (1974); Note, Res Judicata 
and Section 1983: The Effect of State Court Judgments on Civil Rights Actions, 27 
U.C.L.A. L. REv. 177 (1979) [hereinafter cited as Res Judicata and Section 1983). 
As implicit in decisions giving issue-preclusive effect to state criminal convictions in 
subsequent § 1983 federal actions, see, e.g., Wiggins v. Murphy, 576 F.2d 572, 573 (4th 
Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 1091 (1979); Mastracchio v. Ricci, 498 F.2d 1257, 1258 
(1st Cir. 1974); Thistlethwaite v. City of New York, 497 F.2d 339, 341 (2d Cir. 1974), 
claim preclusion is inapplicable to collateral attacks on state convictions. Collateral pro-
ceedings do not constitute the same cause of action - the parties on collateral review 
differ from those involved in the state adjudication. See Martin v. Delcambre, 578 F.2d 
1164, 1165 (5th Cir. 1978); Rimmer v. Fayetteville Police Dept., 567 F.2d 273, 276 (4th 
Cir. 1977); Graves v. Olgiati, 550 F.2d 1327, 1329 (2d Cir. 1977). Cases which facially 
suggest application of claim preclusion in a § 1983 suit subsequent to a state criminal 
conviction, see, e.g., Rhodes v. Meyer, 334 F.2d 709, 712-13 (8th Cir. 1964); Goss v. Illi-
nois, 312 F.2d 257, 259 (7th Cir. 1963); cf. Turco v. Monroe County Bar Ass'n, 554 F.2d 
515, 520-21 (2d Cir. 1977) (constitutional challenge under § 1983 to state disbarment 
procedure), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 834 (1977), appear to have blurred together issue and 
claim preclusion in situations where the "actually litigated" distinction between the two 
doctrines was not critical because all matters had been fully and actually litigated in the 
state proceedings. 
120 See, e.g., Huron Holding Corp. v. Lincoln Mine Operating Co., 312 U.S. 183, 194 
(1941); American Surety Co. v. Baldwin, 287 U.S. 156, 166-67 (1932). 
111 Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153-54 (1979) ("To preclude parties from 
contesting matters that they have had a full and fair opportunity to litigate protects 
their adversaries from the expense and vexation attending multiple lawsuits, conserves 
judicial resources, and fosters reliance on judicial action by minimizing the possibility of 
inconsistent decisions."). 
m Allen v. McCurry, 101 S.Ct. 411, 415 (1980); see Doescher v. Estelle, 454 F. Supp. 
943, 948 (N.D. Tex. 1978) ("Judicial comity is the principle in accordance with which the 
courts of one jurisdiction will give effect to the laws and judicial decisions of another 
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U.S.C. § 1738,123 embodies an express command that federal 
courts give the same res judicata effect to a state decision as 
would other courts of that state. 124 
Federal courts, however, are not faced with an ineluctable 
mandate to give preclusive effect to matters previously decided 
in state courts. Rather, both the common law principles of res 
jurisdiction, not as a matter of obligation but out of deference and respect."), aff'd in 
part, vacated in part, remanded, 616 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1980); Collateral-Estoppel 
Effect, supra note 108, at 1482-83. 
111 The statute provides in part: "Acts, records and judicial proceedings ... shall have 
the same full faith and credit in every court within the United States . . . as they shall 
have by law or usage in the courts of such State ... from which they are taken." 28 
U.S.C. § 1738 (1976). The constitutional full faith and credit clause, U.S. CONST. art. IV, 
§ 1, is applicable only between the states. 
The commentators disagree whether § 1738 even applies to § 1983 actions seeking 
relitigation of matters previously decided in state courts. Compare Averitt, Federal Sec-
tion 1983 Actions After State Court Judgment, 44 U. CoLO. L. REv. 191, 203 (1972), and 
Theis, supra note 90, at 876 (arguing that § 1738 is not applicable to federal § 1983 
actions following state proceedings, because no state court ever considers the appropri-
ateness of relitigating state decisions in a putatively more sympathetic federal forum), 
with P. BATOR, P. MISHKIN, D. SHAPIRO & H. WECHSLER, HART & WECHSLER's THE FED-
ERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 244 (2d ed. Supp. 1981), and Currie, supra note 
25, at 332 (contending that the full faith and credit statute mandates giving preclusive 
effect to state judgments in § 1983 actions). The discussion may nonetheless be largely 
academic; if § 1738 does not control, the policy concerns underlying application of com-
mon law res judicata principles between federal and state courts are similar if not identi-
cal. See note 124 infra. 
11
• See Davis v. Davis, 305 U.S. 32, 40 (1938); Wayside Transp. Co., Inc. v. Marcell's 
Motor Express, Inc., 284 F.2d 868, 870-71 (1st Cir. 1960). 
Whether § 1738 and common law preclusion principles are divisible concepts is uncer-
tain. While some courts and commentators perceive § 1738 as merely the statutory em-
bodiment of res judicata principles, see, e.g., Kremer v. Chemical Constr. Corp., 464 F. 
Supp. 468, 471 (S.D.N.Y. 1978), atf'd, 623 F.2d 786 (2d Cir. 1980); Section 1983 Actions, 
supra note 91, at 96 n.9, others see res judicata as a distinct and perhaps more expansive 
principle than the statutory command of§ 1738. See, e.g., Winters v. Lavine, 574 F.2d 
46, 55 (2d Cir. 1978); Collateral-Estoppel Effect, supra note 108, at 1482. Compounding 
the uncertainty is a welter of cases which fail to mention § 1738, while discussing 
whether collateral estoppel should bar relitigation of a constitutional issue previously 
decided in a state court. See, e.g., Montana v. United States, 440 U.S. 147, 153 (1979); 
Lombard v. Board of Educ. 502 F.2d 631, 636-37 (2d Cir. 1974); Metros v. United States 
District Court, 441 F.2d 313, 317 (10th Cir. 1971); Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270, 
1273-74 (3d Cir. 1970). "[T]his phenomenon of apparent disregard of the requirements 
of§ 1738 has never been comprehensively explored or explained .... " Winters v. La-
vine, 574 F.2d at 55; see 88 HARV. L. REv. 453, 455-56 (1974). Whatever the ultimate 
resolution of this uncertainty, for purposes of the present analysis, § 1738 and common 
law res judicata principles can safely be treated as one. Both are motivated by a solici-
tude for repose of state court decisions, and the competing policy considerations which 
would warrant relaxation of res judicata principles should also justify easing the statu-
tory mandate of § 1738. See notes 125-26 and accompanying text infra. In fact, the most 
recent Supreme Court pronouncement on the res judicata effect to be given state deci-
sions, Allen v. McCurry, 101 S.Ct. 411 (1980), persistently treats the two concepts as 
fungible, at least for policy analysis. Id. at 416, 417. 
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judicata1n and the statutory command of section 1738126 can 
yield to competing policy considerations flowing from federal 
statutory or constitutional precepts. Section .1983, intended "to 
interpose the federal courts between the States and the peo-
ple,"U17 arguably presents precisely such countervailing policy 
concerns. Many commentators1ll8 and several courts129 have 
urged that state court criminal proceedings not be accorded 
preclusive effect in subsequent section 1983 actions.130 The crim-
inal defendant has not elected the state forum;131 giving preclu-
116 England v. Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 429 (1964) (Douglas, J., 
concurring) ("res judicata is not a constitutional principle"); Angel v. Bullington, 330 
U.S. 183, 202 (1947) (Rutledge, J., dissenting) ("Res judicata is a generally sound but by 
no means unlimited policy of judicial action."); Vestal, Preclusion/Res Judicata Vari-
ables: Criminal Prosecutions, 19 VAND. L. REv. 683, 718 (1966) (other societal interests 
may force the rules of preclusion to give way). 
111 American Mannex Corp. v. Rozands~ 462 F.2d 688, 690 (5th Cir.) ("Other well-
defined policies, statutory or constitutional, may compete with those policies underlying 
section 1738."), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1040 (1972); Porter v. Nossen, 360 F. Supp. 527, 
528 (M.D. Pa. 1973) ("certain federal policies may mandate refusal to follow the letter of 
the statutory command" of§ 1738), aff'd, 511 F.2d 1395 (3d Cir. 1975); see Batiste v. 
Furnco Constr. Corp., 503 F.2d 447, 450 (7th Cir. 1974) ("strong Congressional policy 
that plaintiffs not be deprived of their right to resort to the federal courts for adjudica-
tion of their federal claims under Title VIl" held to outweigh policies underlying §' 1738), 
cert. denied, 420 U.S. 928 (1975). 
'" Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972). 
111 Averitt, supra note 123, at 195; McCormack, supra note 14, at 276; Theis, supra 
note 90, at 882; Section 1983 Developments, supra note 7, at 1338-43; 88 HARv. L. REv. 
453, 460 (1974); Contra, Currie, supra note 25, at 329 ("The general legislative distrust 
of state courts evinced by section 1983 can be given considerable compass without dis-
turbing section 1738."). 
, .. Henry v. First Nat1 Bank, 595 F.2d 291, 298 n.l (5th Cir. 1979) (dictum); Ney v. 
California, 439 F.2d 1285, 1288 (9th Cir. 1971) (dictum); Moran v. Mitchell, 354 F. Supp. 
86, 88 (E.D. Va. 1973) (dictum). 
Most cases confronted with the issue have held issue preclusion fully applicable to 
§ 1983 actions subsequent to state criminal convictions. See, e.g., Meadows v. Evans, 529 
F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir. 1976), aff'd en bane, 550 F.2d 345 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 434 
U.S. 969 (1977); Metros v. United States District Court, 441 F.2d 313, 317 (10th Cir. 
1971); Kauffman v. Moss, 420 F.2d 1270, 1274 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 846 
(1970); Mulligan v. Schlachter, 389 F.2d 231, 233 (6th Cir. 1968) (dictum). 
180 Under a proposed but unsuccessful amendment to § 1983, the Civil Rights Im-
provement Act of 1979, S. 1983, 96th Cong., 1st Sess., 125 Cong. Rec. 815,994 (daily ed. 
Nov. 6, 1979), issue-preclusive effect could not have been given to a state adjudication in 
a subsequent § 1983 action. Relitigation of matters previously decided in state court 
would have been constrained by principles of claim preclusion only where the federal 
§ 1983 plaintiff had previously been the plaintiff in state court. Id. § 2(f). Thus no state 
criminal proceeding would have been accorded preclusive effect in subsequent § 1983 
litigation. 
111 The commentators have advocated, more precisely, an exception to normal preclu-
sion principles whenever the § 1983 plaintiff was an "involuntary litigant" in the state 
proceedings. In all but the most unusual circumstances, the state criminal defendants 
under consideration here, see notes 18-20 and accompanying text supra, fall within the 
sphere of "involuntary" state litigants. Theis, supra note 90, at 868; 88 HARv. L. REv. 
453,463 (1974). Only in an uncommon situation such as that presented in Thistlethwaite 
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sive effect to the state judgment compels acceptance of state 
court resolution of constitutional matters. 132 According finality 
to such resolutions contradicts the central premise of section 
1983 - that the state forum cannot adequately enforce federal 
constitutional rights138 - thereby "effectively frustrat[ing] the 
Congressional intent that section 1983 serve as a safeguard 
against the infringement of federally protected rights by a 
state's judiciary."184 
a. The Allen v. McCurry barrier- A recent Supreme Court 
decision, Allen v. McCurry, 1811 rejected definitively the general 
notion that state criminal proceedings should never be given 
preclusive effect in subsequent section 1983 damage actions. 
Plaintiff McCurry had been convicted in state court of posses-
sion of heroin and assault with intent to kill. 188 He subsequently 
filed a section 1983 claim in federal court seeking damages from 
several arresting police officers and the Saint Louis police de-
partment for an allegedly unconstitutional search and seizure.187 
The Eighth Circuit :,;ejected the police officers' argument that is-
sue preclusion barred relitigation of the search and seizure claim 
previously decided adversely to McCurry in state court. The 
court reasoned that "the special role of federal courts in protect-
ing civil rights" required preclusive effect not be given the prior 
criminal conviction where as a result McCurry would be denied 
a federal forum for airing his constitutional claim.188 The Su-
preme Court reversed, finding res judicata principles wholly ap-
v. City of New York, 497 F.2d 339 (2d Cir. 1974), where the defendant was given the 
opportunity to "drop the whole matter," id. at 342, but declined, might the criminal 
defendant be said to have "elected" the state forum. 
10 See Averitt, supra note 123, at 192; McCormack, supra note 14, at 260; 88 HARV. L. 
REv. 453, 460 (1974); cf. England v. Board of Medical Examiners, 375 U.S. 411, 415 
(1964) ("fundamental objections to any conclusion that a litigant who has properly in-
voked the jurisdiction of a Federal District Court to consider federal constitutional 
claims can be compelled, without his consent and through no fault of his own, to accept 
instead a state court's determination of those claims"). 
10 See note 90 and accompanying text supra. 
'" Henry v. First Nat'l Bank, 595 F.2d 291, 298 n.1 (5th Cir. 1979) (dictum). See also 
Ney v. California, 439 F.2d 1285, 1288 (9th Cir. 1971) (dictum) (§ 1983 "would, in many 
cases, be a dead letter" if res judicata effect were given to a successful state prosecu-
tion.); McCormack, supra note 14, at 251; Section 1983 Developments, supra note 7, at 
1333. 
116 101 S. Ct. 411 (1980). 
, .. McCurry v. Allen, 606 F.2d 795, 796 (8th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 101 S. Ct. 411 (1980). 
117 606 F.2d at 797. 
118 Id. at 799. Although McCurry was imprisoned, he had available no other federal 
collateral relief, because Fourth Amendment claims are not cognizable in habeas corpus 
where there has been full and fair litigation of the issue in state criminal proceedings. 
Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). · 
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plicable to McCurry's section 1983 suit. 189 The Court discerned 
nothing in the language or legislative history to warrant un-
restricted relitigation of matters previously decided in state 
court, even if the section 1983 plaintiff had been an involuntary 
state litigant. Ho 
The Court grounded its decision upon the determination that 
the legislative history surrounding the 1871 enactment of section 
1983 manifested no "congressional intent to deny binding effect 
to a state court judgment."141 The Court's reliance upon the si-
lence of the 1871 Congress, however, is disingenuous. The 1871 
Congress could not have perceived preclusion principles as sig-
nificant in civil proceedings following state criminal convic-
tions, 142 due to the operation of the doctrine of mutuality of es-
toppel. Ha No criminal prosecution in 1871 could have issue-
119 101 S. Ct. at 420. 
140 Id. The Court found no "reason to believe that Congress intended to provide a 
person claiming a federal right an unrestricted opportunity to relitigate an issue already 
decided in state court simply because the issue arose in a state proceeding in which he 
would rather not have been engaged at all." Id. It discovered no authority for the "gener-
ally framed principle that every person asserting a federal right is entitled to one unen-
cumbered opportunity to litigate that right in a federal district court." Id. at 419. There 
would be no relaxation of traditional preclusion principles in § 1983 actions where the 
state court "has given the parties a full and fair opportunity to litigate federal claima, 
and thereby has shown itself willing and able to protect federal rights." Id. at 420. 
Thus the Court equated "a full and fair opportunity to litigate" with the state court's 
being "willing and able" to protect federal rights. But given the respective institutional 
postures of state and federal courts, see notes 38-44 and accompanying text supra, "full" 
adjudication in state courts may not necessarily be synonymous with full vindication of 
constitutional rights, even where the state court faithfully adheres to the judicial oath. 
See note 46 supra. 
"
1 101 S. Ct. at 419-20. 
141 The Court gave little weight to this issue in McCurry: 
Because the requirement of mutuality of estoppel was still alive in the federal 
courts until well into this century ... [the § 1983 drafters] may have had leas 
reason to concern themselves with rules of preclusion than a modem Congress 
would. Nevertheless, in 1871 res judicata and collateral estoppel could certainly 
have applied in federal suits following state-court litigation between the same 
parties or their privies . . . . 
Id. at 416. Federal suits "between the same parties or their privies," however, are inap-
poaite to the McCurry situation or to § 1983 plaintiffs who seek collateral review of state 
convictions, because the parties in the § 1983 action differ from the parties in the state 
criminal proceeding. See note 119 supra. 
••• See, e.g., Bigelow v. Old Dominion Copper Mining & Smelting Co., 225 U.S. 111 
(1912). Mutuality of eatoppel dictates that a party cannot be bound by a prior judgment 
unless the other party to the present action would also be bound by that judgment. Thus 
a party to the second action who was a stranger to the first action could not invoke issue 
preclusion to bar relitigation in the second action of a matter determined adversely to 
another party in the first action. The leading case rejecting mutuality of estoppel was 
Bernhard v. Bank of America, 19 Cal. 2d 807, 810-13, 122 P.2d 892, 894-95 (1942). The 
Supreme Court followed suit in Blonder-Tongue Laba, Inc. v. University of lli. Founda-
tion, 402 U.S. 313, 320-27 (1971). See also Parklane Hosiery Co. v. Shore, 439 U.S. 322 
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preclusive effect in subsequent civil proceedings. 144 This expla-
nation of the 1871 Congress' silence undermines the essential 
premise of the McCurry decision. Buttressing this explanation is 
the underlying legislative purpose of section 1983 to "interpose 
the federal courts between the States and the people. "1n This 
purpose, though susceptible of differing interpretations, 148 seems 
fundamentally opposed to stringent application of preclusion 
principles to section 1983 actions. If the 1871 Congress perceived 
state courts as "antipathetic" to the vindication of federally 
created rights, 147 it appears illogical to suggest that Congress in-
tended federal courts to give preclusive effect in federal matters 
to the judgments of those selfsame courts. 148 
The McCurry holding creates an acute dilemma for the state 
defendant. Accepting the Court's view that preclusion principles 
should apply fully in federal civil rights actions, the state crimi-
nal adjudication still will be accorded only issue-, not claim-
preclusive effect in the subsequent section 1983 suit.149 Thus a 
state defendant may assert a constitutional defense in the state 
proceeding and be precluded from relitigating that issue in an 
(1979). 
"' Allen v. McCurry, 101 S.Ct. 411, 425 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also 
Section 1983 Developments, supra note 7, at 1339 n.39 ("Since collateral estoppel has 
been narrowly applied until quite recently, the Reconstruction Congress could not have 
anticipated the impediment that a more liberal usage would be to § 1983 suits."). 
"' Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972). 
141 Compare Allen v. McCurry, 101 S. Ct. 411, 417-18 (1980), with id. at 421-24 
(Blackmun, J., dissenting). See generally Avina, The Klu Klux Klan Act of 1871: Some 
Reflected Light on State Action and the Fourteenth Amendment, 11 ST. LoUIS U.L.J. 
331 (1967). 
1
" Mitchum v. Foster, 407 U.S. 225, 242 (1972). 
"' Allen v. McCurry, 101 S. Ct. 411, 423 (1980) (Blackmun, J., dissenting). See also 
The Preclusiue Effect of State Judgments, supra note 34, at 623 ("It would seem illogi-
cal • • . to suppose that Congress intended the federal courts to accord full faith and 
credit to the judgments of the very tribunals that it feared were subverting federal 
rights."). 
The Court in McCurry failed to respond satisfactorily to the concern expressed in Ney 
v. California, 439 F.2d 1285, 1288 (9th Cir. 1971), that strict application of issue preclu-
sion to§ 1983 actions could make the Civil Rights Act a "dead letter." See note 134 and 
accompanying text supra. The Court argued only that this concern was dictum - that 
the underlying constitutional claim had not been decided in the state court, thus issue 
preclusion could not bar the § 1983 action. 101 S. Ct. at 419 n.18. But this hardly ad-
dresses the underlying consideration in Ney that § 1983 would be a hollow means for 
redressing federal constitutional deprivations if preclusion rules could bar relitigation of 
issues determined adversely to the § 1983 plaintiff in state court. 
"' See note 119 supra. Although the dissent in McCurry suggested that under the 
Court's reasoning the § 1983 litigant would be precluded from relitigating any issue po-
tentially as well as actually litigated, 101 S.Ct. at 424-25 n.12 (Blackmun, J., dissenting), 
the majority clearly indicated that collateral estoppel applies only to issues actually de-
cided, id. at 418, stressing that it was not fashioning a novel doctrine of collateral estop-
pel. Id. at 415 n.7. 
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ensuing section 1983 action should the state court reject the de-
fense. The defendant may reserve the constitutional claim only 
by not raising it during the state proceedings, thereby incurring 
a greater risk of state conviction. 1110 This places an onerous bur-
den on the state defendant: a section 1983 hearing comes at the 
price of an enhanced probability of conviction in state court. uu 
b. The viability of collateral review under section 1983 follow-
ing McCurry- Ample basis exists for disputing the holding in 
McCurry. Yet the feasibility of section 1983 as a vehicle for col-
1110 See Johnson v. Mateer, 625 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1980); Moran v. Mitchell, 354 F. 
Supp. 86, 88 (E.D. Va. 1973). 
Whether many state criminal defendants will forego constitutional defenses in state 
courts in contemplation of subsequent § 1983 litigation is not clear. Compare Section 
1983 Developments, supra note 7, at 1340 (reserving the constitutional defense and in-
creasing the risk of adverse state judgment "will often seem the lesser of two evils to 
state defendants"), with Section 1983 Actions, supra note 91, at 97 (the state criminal 
defendant has little choice as a practical matter "for the urgency of avoiding conviction 
requires that he assert all possible defenses during the state trial"). It seems less likely 
that the defendant will withhold constitutional arguments where the § 1983 suit thereby 
preserved is a damage claim than where the defendant can reserve a § 1983 collateral 
attack upon the state conviction. In most instances the prospect of a civil damage rem-
edy will not justify the increased danger of criminal conviction and potential incarcera-
tion. See Allen v. McCurry, 101 S. Ct. 411, 420 n.23 (1980). It might also be expected 
that the state defendant would be more willing to risk an adverse state decision in, for 
instance, a misdemeanor prosecution where the potential sanctions are insubstantial. 
Two procedural considerations counsel against the state defendant's preserving a 
§ 1983 action by withholding constitutional defenses in state court. Any possibility of 
discretionary Supreme Court review of the defendant's constitutional claim is foreclosed 
if those claims are not asserted in the state adjudication. Cardinale v. Louisiana, 394 
U.S. 437,438 (1969). More important, failure to assert a constitutional defense may work 
a waiver of the claim. Absent a showing of "cause" and "actual prejudice," nonadherence 
to state procedural rules requiring contemporaneous objections may bar subsequent col-
lateral relief based upon such potential objections. See Allen v. McCurry, 101 S.Ct. at 
426 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (the § 1983 plaintiff faces uncertainty in foregoing litiga-
tion on any issue during the state trial, "for there is the possibility that he will be held to 
have waived his right to appeal on that issue"). See generally Hill, The Forfeiture of 
Constitutional Rights in Criminal Cases, 78 CoLUM. L. REv. 1050 (1978); Spritzer, Crim-
inal Waiver, Procedural Default and the Burger Court, 126 U. PA. L. REv. 473 (1978); 
Westen, Away from Waiver: A Rationale for the Forfeiture of Constitutional Rights in 
Criminal Procedure, 75 MICH. L. REv. 1214 (1977). 
111 See Johnson v. Mateer, 625 F.2d 240, 244 (9th Cir. 1980) (the price of the state 
criminal defendant's "constitutional claim in federal court should not be a heightened 
risk of conviction in state court"); Moran v. Mitchell, 354 F. Supp. 86, 88 (E.D. Va. 1973) 
(state defendant faces a "Robson's choice"); 88 HARv. L. REv. 453, 462 (1974). 
To the extent state defendants forego constitutional defenses, the rationale for strict 
application of preclusion principles is compromised. Failure to submit valid constitu-
tional defenses to state adjudication diminishes the finality of the proceedings; "the just 
prosecution of state laws is not enhanced by a system which discourages the litigation of 
constitutional defenses." Section 1983 Developments, supra note 7, at 1340. Moreover, a 
primary premise underlying the stipulation of an exhaustion requirement, promotion of 
uniformity and involvement of state courts in the application of federal law, see notes 
102-05 and accompanying text supra, would be weakened. 
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lateral review need not rest upon a conclusion that the McCurry 
result is erroneous. A section 1983 damage action such as that 
presented in McCurry may not warrant departure from standard 
preclusion principles. The essential purpose of the section 1983 
cause of action for damages, accomplished derivatively through 
monetary awards for consequential injury,m is to deter en-
croachment upon federal rights by local officials. 1113 Deterrence 
of constitutional violations, albeit a salutary systemic objective, 
may be achieved without relaxation of preclusion principles. The 
deterrent "message" from section 1983 actions stems from a cu-
mulative effect not dependent upon any specific case. Local offi-
cials can be deterred adequately from transgressing constitu-
tional bounds by the enforcement of section 1983 claims in cases 
other than those brought after successful state prosecutions. The 
deterrence rationale does not warrant relitigation of constitu-
tional matters previously decided adversely to the section 1983 
plaintiff in state court, provided other section 1983 actions pro-
duce a sufficient deterrent message.164 
In contrast, collateral review of state criminal convictions acts 
as a safeguard for personal liberty interests. Liberty interests are 
crucially implicated whether the collateral proceedings seek re-
lease from custody or expungement of the record of convic-
101 See Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247, 255 (1978) (§ 1983 damage awards should be 
determined in accordance with tort principles of compensation for identifiable injury). 
But cf. Newman, Suing the Lawbreakers: Proposals to Strengthen· the Section 1983 
Damage Remedy for Law Enforcers' Misconduct, 87 YALE L.J 447, 465 (1978) (sug-
gesting liquidated damages for deprivation of the constitutional right itself, in addition 
to compensatory damages for actual IOBB); Note, Damage Awards for Constitutional 
Torts: A Reconsideration After Carey v. Piphus, 93 HARv. L. RBv. 966,967 (1980) [here-
inafter cited as Damage Awards] ("[T]he purpose of[§ 1983) ... remedies is not merely 
compensation for the consequential injuries that accompany a constitutional violation, 
but more fundamentally redreBB for the abridgement of the constitutional right itself."). 
10
• See Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 442 (1976) (White, J., concurring) (deter-
rence of unconstitutional or otherwise illegal conduct "was precisely the proposition 
upon which § 1983 was enacted"); Nahmod, Section 1983 and the "Background" of Tort 
Liability, 50 IND. L.J. 5, 10-11 (1974); Whitman, Constitutional Torts, 79 MlcH. L. RBv. 
5, 56 (1980); Damage Awards, supra note 152, at 981. 
114 Furthermore, the deterrent value of the succeBBful resolution of a constitutional 
claim such as that presented in Allen v. McCurry, 101 S.Ct. 411 (1980), is unclear. Deter-
rence derives from firm statements to "the constable [who] has blundered," People v. 
Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 21, 150 N.E. 585, 587, cert. denied, 270 U.S. 657 (1926) (Cardozo, 
J.), regarding the permissibility of past conduct. No such firm statement emanates from 
inconsistent federal and state adjudications. A state criminal conviction rejecting the 
constitutional claim and incarcerating the defendant, juxtaposed against a § 1983 action 
adjudging the claim meritorious and awarding damages, surely must present a quandary 
fqr local police. Cf. Stone v. Powell, 428 U.S. 465, 493-95 (1976) (enforcement of Fourth 
Amendment exclusionary rule on collateral review so attenuated from the constitutional 
violation as to have only minimal deterrent effect upon police conduct). 
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tion. 11111 A damage action, although arguably less intrusive upon 
state processes and comity interests than collateral review of a 
state conviction, 1116 also serves a less important function. A suc-
cessful resolution of McCurry's section 1983 damage suit, for in-
stance, would have no effect upon his liberty interests.167 
A higher order of individual rights, therefore, is at stake on 
collateral attack than in the section 1983 damage action. Indeed, 
the importance of the personal liberty interests involved pro-
vides the basis for the traditional exception to normal rules of 
preclusion for habeas corpus review.1118 Similarly, preclusion 
principles should not bar relitigation in section 1983 collateral 
attacks on state convictions, given the nature of the interests in-
volved and the tightly drawn analogy to habeas corpus relief.1119 
10
• Carafas v. La Vallee, 391 U.S. 234, 237-38 (1968); see notes 23-24 and accompanying 
text supra. The relief sought through a writ of habeas corpus at times may be identical 
to that sought on § 1983 collateral review where the plaintiff is not in custody. See note 
54 supra. 
, .. See, e.g., Section 1983 Developments, supra note 7, at 1339 ("[T]he integrity of the 
prior judgment and the parties' reliance thereon are not jeopardized to the same extent 
when the federal court is . engaged in relitigation of particular issues of law and fact 
rather than in reexamination and possible nullification of that judgment."); Collateral-
Estoppel Effect, supra note 108, at 1494 ("there can be no claim that the federal courts 
are undoing the efforts of the state criminal-justice system" through a § 1983 suit for 
damages). 
Reference to the specifics of Allen v. McCurry, 101 S. Ct. 411 (1980), however, demon-
strates that § 1983 damage actions can effectively intrude as fully as collateral review 
upon state interests. McCurry alleged an unconstitutional search in his § 1983 damage 
suit; successful resolution of the claim would necessarily reflect upon his conviction for 
possession of heroin discovered through the search. Id. at 413-14; see notes 136-37 and 
accompanying text supra. Although McCurry could not seek release from custody even if 
successful on the merits of his Fourth Amendment claim, see note 138 supra, the federal 
adjudication would nonetheless "undo the efforts of the state criminal-justice system" in 
essence if not in fact. See also Rimmer v. Fayetteville Police Dept., 567 F.2d 273 (4th 
Cir. 1977) (§ 1983 damage action which effectively challenged the validity of the state 
court convictions). Cf. Whitman, supra note 153, at 30 ("insidious" displacement of state 
law through constitutional tort actions under § 1983). 
107 Even for the § 1983 plaintiff not in custody, compensatory damages could never 
embrace all the myriad collateral disabilities flowing from the record of conviction. See 
notes 21-24 and accompanying text supra. 
, .. Allen v. McCurry, 101 S. Ct. 411, 417 n.12 (1980). 
10
• See Brown v. Chastain, 416 F.2d 1012, 1021 (5th Cir. 1969) (Rives, J., dissenting) 
(relitigation should be available in § 1983 cases "significantly involving human liberty"); 
McCormack, supra note 14, at 284 ("[i)n view of the affinity between habeas corpus and 
section 1983 actions," relitigation should be available under § 1983); Theis, supra note 
90, at 872-73; Res Judicata and Section 1983, supra note 119, at 212 (liberty interests 
are treated more favorably than property interests in the application of res judicata). 
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CONCLUSION 
495 
The effectuation of federal rights depends critically upon 
collateral review of state criminal convictions. If habeas corpus 
procedure cabins the scope of collateral review, parties not in 
custody who allege constitutional deprivations in the state crimi-
nal process will not enjoy full consideration of their federal 
claims. The habeas corpus custody prerequisite to collateral re-
lief should be eliminated, either through legislation or by judi-
cial adoption of the Civil Rights Act as a vehicle for collateral 
review of state convictions. Custody simply does not provide a 
suitable touchstone for delimiting federal court involvement in 
the vindication of federally guaranteed rights. 
-Timothy C. Hester 

